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Abstract—Cognitive Radio provides a paradigm to enable an
efficient and performing use of spectrum resources. Several
challenging issues are still to be solved in order to fully exploit
the CR potentials. One of these is the development of efficient
distributed power allocation methods to be performed by the
independent decisional entities of the network. Game Theory, and
in particular S-Modular Games, are attracting since they provide
useful tools for the definition of multi objective distributed
decisional algorithms in the context of radio communications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Because of the increasing and continuous demand of ser-
vices and radio resources, the traditional communication sys-
tems which imply an a priori association of the frequency
band, the service assigned to it and the used technology,
need to become much more flexible, efficient and easy-to-
use dynamic systems able to cope with the requirements and
constraints of the environment and the users. A Cognitive
Radio (CR) approach can be considered as a promising and
suitable solution to solve this problem. CR systems are char-
acterized by a series of challenging technological problems
to be addressed as exposed by Mitola and Haykin in [1],
[2]. The search for available resources is not limited to
spectrum portions dedicated to unlicensed communications,
but is also extended to licensed bands. This paper shows the
potential benefits of the adoption of a cognitive radio strategy
to the coexistence problem. The developed cognitive radio
strategy it has been formulated according the mathematical
discipline of Game Theory, with particular reference to S-
Modular Games [3]. The main reason because Game Theory
has been considered as resource allocation method is due to
its distributed implementation nature. Such attractive feature
allows to achieve the flexibility and the efficient adaptation to
the operative environment that were previously mentioned. S-
Modular games have been used for power allocation in cellular
networks by Altman and Altman in [4]. This paper extends
their results in the case a CR dislocation of transmitters and
receivers, as well as proposes a new allocation strategy for
multi-carrier allocation.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section II the basic
theory of S-Modular games is presented. The proposed allo-
cation schemes is reported in Section III, while in Section IV
the results from computer simulation are commented. Finally
some conclusions are expressed in Section V.
II. S-MODULAR GAMES
Game theory provides a set of powerful tools in order to
predict the evolution of dynamical multiple decisional entities
operating in the same context. One relevant key classes of
games are the supermodular games (S-Games). We focus our
attention to a set of N users playing on a strategy space S. It
means that each element of S represents the possible choice of
all players at a given time of the play. Introduced by Topkis in
[3], S-Games are normal form games Γ = 〈N,S, {fi}〉 where
N is the set of users, S the strategy space, fi the set of utility
functions and ∀i ∈ N these conditions are satified:
1) the strategy space Si of user i is a complete lattice.
2) fi is supermodular in si.
3) fi presents increasing differences in x.
The utility functions fi map the strategy space S on a real
value. For convenience the strategy x ∈ S is decomposed into
(xi, x−i) where x−i indicates all the components of x not
belonging to user i.
The first condition is easily verified for compact subset of
m where m is the strategy space dimension.
Supermodularity of a function f : X →  states that:
f(x′) + f(x′′) ≥ f(x′ ∨ x′′) + f(x′ ∧ x′′) ∀x′, x′′ ∈ X (1)
Where a ∨ b is the join operation defined as the minimum
component-wise vector among a and b. Similarly a ∧ b is
the meet operation defined as the maximum component-wise
vector. When fi is twice differentiable, supermodularity is




for all x ∈ S and i = j.
The increasing differences property has been defined in [5].
For a partially ordered set X ⊂ n, we define a relational
operator ≥ so that we can write x ≥ y if x, y ∈ X and xk ≥
yk∀k = 1, . . . , n. A function f has increasing differences in
(xi, x−i) if for all pairs xi, x¯i ∈ Xi such that xi ≥ x¯i, and
all pairs x−i, x¯−i ∈ X−i such that x−i ≥ x¯−i, Eq. (3) holds.
f(xi, x−i)− f(x¯i, x−i) ≥ f(xi, x¯−i)− f(x¯i, x¯−i) (3)978-1-4244-5213-4/09/ $26.00 ©2009 IEEE 1805
The increasing differences property applied to utility functions
is relevant to the Cognitive Radio problem. If the strategy
space is the allocated power on the radio channels/sub-carriers
and the utility function is related to the signal to noise plus
interference ratio (SINR) experienced by users, an increased
power floor from other users results in a increased power of
the desired one.
All the users play with the same strategic rational behavior,
following the so-called Best Response (BR) decision rule,
defined as for each i:
BRi(x−i) = max[arg max
xi∈Si
f(xi, x−i)] (4)
The BR decision is a distributed one as it is taken indepen-
dently from each user. The evaluation of the utility function
requires the complete knowledge of the choices operated
previously from other users x−i. In practical implementations
the visibility of others is limited to the effectiveness of the
sensing functions available in the Cognitive Radio system as
described in [1].
When the cited conditions are met, the S-modular game is
proven to have a unique Nash Equilibrium (NE) point and to
show a monotone convergence to it when the BR decisions is
operated by the users.
A slightly more complicated scenario is found when the
strategy set for each user depends from the choices of others,
i.e. when Si = Si(x−i). In this case if the policy set Si is
convex and exists a fesible choice x so that xi ∈ Si(x−i) and
for each user i, BRi(x−i) > 0, we obtain the uniqueness of
the NE and the convergence to it for the random or round-
robin updating rule.
In the next sections we adapt the above S-modular game
to the problem of spectrum coexistence of multiple cognitive
radios.
III. THE PROPOSED ALLOCATION SCHEMES
The Cognitive Radio context considered in this paper is
characterized by N users, namely the players of the game,
operating on M radio resources (i.e. different channels or sub-
carriers of the same multi-carrier channel). Each user is char-
acterized by a transmitter site TXi and a receiver site RXi. In
the most general context we consider the transmitters and the
receivers positions completely independent the ones from the
others. The utility function for each user is represented by its
instantaneous signal to noise plus interference ratio (SINR),
defined as:
γi,c = 10 log10(gi,i,cai,c)− 10 log10(
∑
k =i
gk,i,cak,c + ηi) (5)
where ai,c is the power allocated from the transmitter i
(TXi) on the sub-carrier c, gj,i,c is the instantaneous channel
response from TXj to RXi, while ηi is the AWGN component




− (γi,c(ai, a−i)− γ∗i,c
)2 (6)
where γ∗i,c is the target SINR for user i and sub-carrier c.
The adopted channel model is composed by a small scale
fading and a path-loss component. The path-loss model is the
Okomura-Hata model of [6], while the small scale fading is
modeled as a Rayleigh process. The utility function represents
the (squared) Euclidean distance among the desired SINR
vector (in dB) and the one obtained after the allocation
process. Desired SINR is monotonically related to BER on
each particular carrier, so the minimization of the utility results
in approaching the desired quality of transmission.
As what concerns the game strategies, we analyzed two
possible approaches: the Multiple Carriers Allocation and the
Best Carrier Allocation.
A. Multiple Carriers Allocation Strategy
This decision leads to the selection of the Best Response
combination of sub-carriers powers, given the previous alloca-
tion of other users. The strategy space is a convex sub-lattice
of m, i.e. ai ∈ Si ∈ m and 0 ≤ ai,c < ai,MAX , for each
c = 1, . . . ,M . A decision is taken by a randomly chosen user
at each stage of the game, following the Best Response rule:
BRi(a−i) = arg max
ai∈Si
ui(ai, a−i) (7)
B. Best Carrier Allocation Strategy
With this decision strategy, the selected user first select the
best allocation for each possible carrier, then select the carrier
where she receives the best response. In other words:
∀c ∈ Ci
a∗i,c = arg max
ai,c∈Si,c
ui(ai,c, ai,−c, a−i) (8)
BR∗i (a−i) = arg max
c∈Ci
ui(a∗i,c, ai,−c, a−i) (9)
where Ci is the sub-carriers set, ai,c is the power allocation
on carrier c and ai,−c is the power allocation of all the carriers
except c.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
To evaluate the performance of the analyzed allocation
methods, we focus on the value of the utility function at
the end of the game, averaged over the users set. This
indicator, recalling the definitions in Eq. (6), represents the
mean deviation from the desired SINR: the higher is the value
approaching 0, the better is the allocation obtained by the
game.
The operating context is a terrain square area of 1 Km
edge. The transmitter positions are chosen randomly in the
area, while the receives are placed in a square area of 400
m around their respective transmitters. An example of the
simulated field with 3 users is represented in Fig. 1 where
it is also shown in shaded colors the path-loss component of
the channel model. The simulations presented here have been
conducted with a noise power at the receivers of 0.001 and a
0dB power reference for the path-loss component at a distance














Fig. 1. Instance of a 3 users scenario (shaded colors represent the path loss
component of the channel)
Users Carriers Target SINR Final Utility
3 3 5dB -4.24056×10−25
3 5 5dB -3.84628×10−17
3 15 5dB -0.00624172
5 3 5dB -0.0137993
TABLE I
RESULTS FOR THE MULTIPLE CARRIER ALLOCATION SCHEME





Fig. 2. Convergence of the utility functions for 3-users game with multiple
carrier allocation method
Table I shows the final averaged utility functions of the
power allocation game for the Multiple Carrier strategy with
various configuration of users and carriers.
Table II represents the results for the Best Carrier Allocation
Strategy. This method provides similar results with respect to
the previous method. Its convergence is assured by S-Modular
theory, however in each game iteration a single carrier is
allocated, resulting in a slower convergence and a reduced
complexity required at the Cognitive Managers.
As expected, the convergence time of the multiple allocation
methods is shorter than that of the best carrier selection
method. This is shown in the Figs. 2 and 3 where are
represented the evolutions of the utility values for a 3 users
game (5 sub-carriers, 5 dB desired SINR) for the first 40
iterations of the game.
As an example, Fig.4 represents a 2 section of the utility
Users Carriers Target SINR Final Utility
3 3 5dB -9.15767×10−23
3 5 5dB -4.22214×10−18
3 15 5dB -0.631104
5 3 5dB -9.90912×10−27
10 3 5dB -4.7005×10−22
30 3 5dB -0.000148154
50 3 5dB -145.144
3 5 10dB -0.02085
3 5 15dB -1210.41
TABLE II
RESULTS FOR THE BEST CARRIER ALLOCATION SCHEME
















Fig. 4. Utility function section on 2
function for a specific user of the game with 3 users and 5
resources. In the plot the utility value for the first two carriers
at a specific time during the evolution of the game is reported.
We can easily recognize the maximum of the utility surface
the method will search when the user is allowed to decide. To
show the dependence of the allocation from the desired targets,
Fig.5 shows the final averaged value of the utility functions
for a 5 users games (3 channels, noise variance of 10−3) for a
target SINR ranging from 8 to 15 dB. The dashed line refers
to the multiple carrier allocation while the continuous line
represents the best carrier method. We can note the SINR
target regions where the user cannot be satisfied, resulting in a
decrease of the utility values. We also note the similar behavior
of the two allocation methods.1807









Fig. 5. Averaged utility values vs. SINR for 3 users game (multiple carrier
allocation plotted with the dashed line)










Fig. 6. Effect of power sensing estimate errors on allocation (5 users 3
channels game, 5 dB of SINR target, multiple carrier allocation plotted with
the dashed line)
A. Imperfect Sensing
In the case of imperfect sensing of the radio environment,
the action taken by players lead to a sub-optimal outcome of
the game. To model an impaired sensing of the radio context,
at each game run, the players can access a ”noisy” version of
the previous allocation state, given by:
10 log10(a˜) = 10 log10(a) +  (10)
where  ∈ |S| is the power error vector (in dB) whose
elements are Gaussian i.i.d. The | · | express the dimension
of a space. The Fig. 6 shows the impact of sensing errors
on the game evolution. The abscissa represents the standard
deviation of the log-power estimate error, while the ordinate
is the loss of the averaged true utility function.
B. Complexity and Implementation Considerations
The proposed scheme is part of the class of distributed
resource managers and implies a complete knowledge of
the previous allocation step (also derived from sensing).
The two presented approaches differ substantially from the
complexity point of view. The Multiple Carrier Allocation
strategy involves a M -dimensional maximization process to
be performed by each user at each game step (recall M
is the number of carriers). The Best Carrier Allocation is
obtained through M one-dimensional maximizations followed
by a sorting operation. The drawback of the latter approach is
a slower convergence time, as exposed previously in the paper.
The complete (though not accurate) knowledge of global
allocation status can be obtained through a distributed sensing
function. When the deployment area of the CR terminals is
large, a local information is sufficient to each terminal so a
local un-coordinated sensing can be adopted. On the contrary,
in dense distributions of users, a coordinated broadcasted
sensing is required.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
S-Modular Games have applied successfully to the power
allocation problem when distributed methods are required.
In the CR context, the potentials of this game theory tools
are more relevant than in other scenarios due to the desired
independence of cognitive transmitters. S-Modular games are
proven to be stable, always converging to NE and completely
distributed. The proposed methods provide good allocations
even in the case of multi-dimensional resource space. Further
investigations will analyze the impact of partial information
from the radio environment and of computational constraints
on the cognitive radio managers.
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